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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Perry Wayne Gadue appeals from the summary dismissal of his successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In his underlying criminal case, Gadue was charged with, and a jury convicted 
him of, aggravated battery. Gadue v. State, Docket No. 40286, 2014 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 352, p.1 (Idaho App. Feb. 6, 2014). The court imposed a unified 15-
year sentence with 10 years fixed and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. kl 
Gadue filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming his defense counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) "allow Gadue to testify at trial"; (2) 
"file a motion to compel the production of the victim's knife;" and (3) "file a motion to 
compel the production of a police report." Gadue at 4. The district court summarily 
dismissed Cadue's original petition and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. Gadue 
at 5. 
While the appeal in his first post-conviction case was pending, Gadue filed a 
successive post-conviction petition. (R., pp.10-18.) In his successive petition, 
Caude alleged the state "withheld favorable and conclusive evidence or information 
that would have aided [him] in this matter," several claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and a conflict of interest claim. (R., pp.12-17.) Gadue also filed a 
memorandum in support of his successive petition and a request for counsel. (R., 
pp.386-395.) 
1 
The district court denied Gadue's request for counsel and entered a notice of 
intent to dismiss Gadue's successive petition. (R., pp.396-403.) Gadue responded 
to the court's notice, arguing, in part, that "it would simply be unjust" to dismiss his 
petition and claiming counsel who represented him on his original petition was 
ineffective. (R., pp.404-405.) The court subsequently entered judgment dismissing 




Gadue states the issues on appeal as (verbatim): 
1.) DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDE IN 
DENYING, GADUE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. 
2.) DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDE IN 
DISMISSING CADUE'S SECOND PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.2 (capitalization original).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
1. Has Gadue failed to show error in the denial of his request for the 
appointment of counsel? 
2. Has Gadue failed to establish the district court erred in dismissing his 




Gadue Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Gadue contends the district court erred in denying his request for counsel, 
asserting he believes he has shown his successive post-conviction claims "are not 
frivolous" and that his successive petition "alleges facts showing the possibility of a 
valid claim." (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) Review of the record and the applicable legal 
standards shows the district court correctly concluded Gadue was not entitled to the 
appointment of counsel to represent him on an improper successive petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. State, 2014 WL 712695 *3 (Idaho 
2014), petition for rehearing pending. 
C. Gadue Was Not Entitled To Counsel To Represent Him On His Successive 
Petition 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a 
court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who is unable to 
pay the costs of representation." Murphy at *3 (quoting I.C. § 19-4904; citing 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004)). "The 
standard for determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a 
post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition alleges facts showing the 
4 
possibility of a valid claim." Murphy at *3 (citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 
529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007)). "In deciding whether the prose petition raises the 
possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged 
are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims." Swader v. State, 143 
Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007). The appointment of counsel is not 
appropriate for the purpose of searching the record for potentially nonfrivolous 
claims; rather, the petition itself must allege the facts that raise the possibility of a 
valid claim before the appointment of counsel is warranted. Murphy at *3 (citing 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654, 152 P.3d at 15). 
The district court cited the foregoing standards and denied Cadue's request 
for counsel because Cadue failed to show a sufficient reason for pursuing a 
successive petition as required by I.C. § 19-4908 and, as such, there was no 
possibly valid claim entitling Cadue to counsel. (R., pp.397-398.) Although Cadue 
believes otherwise (Appellant's Brief, p.3), the record supports the district court's 
conclusion. 1 See Murphy at *6 (finding no error in failing to appoint counsel to 
represent petitioner on an improper successive petition). 
1 The reasons the district court was correct in finding Cadue could not overcome the 
successive petition bar are discussed in more detail in Section II, infra. 
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11. 
Gadue Has Failed To Show Error In The Dismissal Of His Successive Post-
Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Gadue asserts the district court erred in dismissing his successive post-
conviction petition because, he contends, "the burden is on the Court to determine 
whether the petitioner lacks sufficient reason for failing to raise the issues of the 
second petition in the previous petition" and, according to Gadue, he satisfied the 
standard for filing a successive petition because he thinks his previous post-
conviction counsel was ineffective. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-7.) Cadue's claim fails 
because his contention that his original post-conviction attorney was ineffective, 
which in itself lacks merit, does not constitute a sufficient reason for filing a 
successive petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate 
court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested 
relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); 
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Cadue's Successive Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 states: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be 
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any 
ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily 
and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction 
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to 
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason 
was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application. 
Gadue contends dismissal of his successive petition was improper because, 
he argues, it was the district court's "burden" to determine whether there was a 
sufficient reason for filing the petition and, according to Gadue, the sufficient reason 
was the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in relation to his 
original petition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-9.) Cadue's arguments lack merit. 
First, to the extent Gadue believes the district court had a sua sponte 
obligation to ascertain whether there was a sufficient reason for filing the petition, he 
is incorrect. It is not the district court's burden to scour the record to ascertain 
whether there is a sufficient reason; rather, the burden for alleging a sufficient 
reason to overcome the procedural bar to successive petitions is on the petitioner. 
Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 948, 908 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Moreover, the court in this case did make a determination that Gadue failed to 
demonstrate a sufficient reason to allow him to file a successive petition. (R., 
pp.399-402.) 
Second, Cadue's contention that he provided a sufficient reason by alleging 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel fails. In support of this claim, 
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Gadue relies on Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 6335 P.2d 955 (1981 ), in which 
the Court held "that an allegation of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction 
counsel may provide sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 to permit allegations of 
error at trial not previously raised or inadequately raised in the initial application to 
be raised in a subsequent post-conviction application." Murphy at *5 (citing Palmer, 
102 Idaho at 596, 635 P.2d at 960). The Court, however, recently overruled Palmer2 
and held that because there is "no statutory or constitutional right to effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel," an allegation of ineffective post-conviction 
counsel "cannot demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a successive petition." 
Murphy at *6. Cadue's reliance on the United States Supreme Court's opinions in 
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013), 
is also misplaced because Martinez .itself reiterates the principle stated in Murphy, 
that there is not constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, and in any event, 
Martinez and Trevino only involve an exception to the procedural default rule that 
allows federal courts to consider claims in habeas that were not exhausted in state 
court. 
Even without the Court's recent pronouncement in Murphy, Gadue could not 
meet his burden of showing a sufficient reason under Palmer because, as noted by 
the district court, Cadue's assertion in this regard was conclusory. (R., p.401.) 
Further, contrary to Cadue's argument, post-conviction counsel did not have the duty 
2 The state recognizes that Murphy was not issued when Gadue filed his successive 
petition and that when Gadue filed his successive petition, claiming ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel was a viable "sufficient reason" for filing a 
successive petition. 
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to amend the original petition to add claims Gadue never raised or to engage in 
discovery that was not authorized by the court. (See R., p.401.) Even if the 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel were still a sufficient reason for 
filing a successive petition, simply claiming post-conviction counsel was ineffective, 
without more, is not enough. In order to avoid summary dismissal, Gadue was still 
required to allege a genuine issue of material fact to support his claim that post-
conviction counsel was ineffective, which in turn required alleging a genuine issue of 
material fact for each claim he believed post-conviction counsel should have raised. 
See Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-154, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008). As 
noted by the district court, Gadue failed to do so in this case. (R., pp.401-402.) 
Gadue has failed to establish otherwise. Indeed, on appeal, Gadue fails to even 
address how he believes he met his burden of alleging a genuine issue of material 
fact in relation to any of the substantive claims he asserted in his successive 
petition. Having failed to present any argument on this point, Gadue has waived 
consideration of the merits of dismissal on this basis. See State v. Goodwin, 131 
Idaho 364,366,956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). 




The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's dismissal 
of Cadue's successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 2yth day of March, 2014. 
J8SSI AM. LORELLO 
DJput Attorney General 
V 
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